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THE FEDERAL INDIAN POLICY IN NEW MEXICO,
1858-1880, II
*'

By FRANK D. REEVE
CHAPTER III
THE BOSQUE REDONDO
HE CHANGE in superintendents temporarily removed
T
the troublesome opposition in the Indian service in New
Mexico toward the Bosque Redondo experiment, for the new
incumbent favored the project. The harmony of views between the military and Indian officials was further strengthened by a clearer definition of their respective jurisdictions,
a troublesome question that had persistently raised its head
from the outbreak of the Navaho war in 1858. The superintendent and agents were advised
. that where Indians are hostile, the civil authority
is to be held in abeyance until the measures taken
by the military authorities for quelling the out. break have been concluded; that where the Indians
are generally quiet and peaceable, but require
prompt action to quell disorders among themselves, or to prevent unlawful interference of
white persons with them, the military are to render assistance when appealed to by the agents;
and at all other times the military are not to interfere with the civil control of the Indians. 1
The Navaho, of course, did not fit readily into this arrangement because Superintendent Steck had refused to accept
formal responsibility. for thelll. The current arrangement,
therefore, was continued for the time being: for dispensing
funds for clothing, implements, and the purchase of sheep
they were under the control of the agent; for subsistence
and general control they continued· as prisoners of war
under the military.
1.

C. I. A., Annual Report, 1865, p. 5.
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But the harmony between the Indian service and the
military solved no fundamental problem. The future of the
Navaho loomed as a great question mark to thqse in positions of responsibility, ahd the seed of discord planted
through Steck bore ,abundant fruit in the next three years.
In the faJl of 1865 the commissioner of Indian affairs wrote
that
In regard to the Navajoes ...the accumulated testimony is so conflicting, derived from sources
equally· entitled to credit, and from persons who
should have, and, so far as appears, have had but
one object in view-the best interests of the government and of the Indians, that I am reluctant at
present to express a decided opinion in regard to'
the permanent policy to be adopted. 2
For the time being, he recommended that the Indians be left
at the Bosque Redondo because they were there and were at
peace. This acceptance of the status quo illustrated the
difficulty of the problem; however, it was only a temporary
acceptance, since measures had already been taken along
two lines to solve it: a congressional investigation had been
instituted in the spring and a special investigator for the
Indian bureau had been appointed. in the summer.
Under a joint resolution of March 3, 1865, a committee
of seven was appointed to inquire into the condition of the
Indian tribes west of the Mississippi. Messrs. Doolittle,
Foster, and Ross were assigned to work in Kansas, Colorado, Utah, New Mexico, and the Indian Territory. They
collected their New Mexico data during the summer, and it
was far from being clear and conclusive. Those who testified at the hearing agreed that a reservation removed from
the settlements and protected by a military force was the
sine qua non. In the second place, the Navaho should be
.made self-supporting by being induced to cultivate the soil
after the example of the Pueblo Indians. This idea was
strengthened by the fact that they had raised some crops
before their removal to the Bosque Redondo. But where the
reservation should be located was the moot point.
2.

Ibid., p. 21-22.
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The proponents of the Bosque Redondo contended that
there was no area sufficiently large in the Navaho country
upon which the tribe could be located and made self-sustaining. Furthermore, the troops could not keep them on the
reservation, and if they were allowed to scatter, trouble
would develop with the New Mexicans as formerly. This
argument was countered by the proposal that the Navaho
should be located in several groups or pueblos in various
parts of their old country which would make it possible for
a few troops to keep them on their reservations. Additional
arguments for the Bosque Redondo were that it contained
good farm land and that the presence of the Navaho there
was a fait accompli and should be continued. Various other
points were advanced pro and con: it. was cheaper to feed
them at the Bosque Redondo than to :fight them in their own
country; fewer troops were required to control them ; a
grazing country in northwestern New Mexico had been
opened to the white man; and the route to Arizona was safe;
on the contrary there was a scarcity of wood around Fort
Sumner, the country 'Q~longed to the Comanche, the area of
farm land was insufficient, the Navaho were self-supporting
in their own country, there were no mines to attract the
whites into the northwest, the Navaho and Apache could not
live together, and the Bosque Redondo entailed immense
cost to the government. 3
Among .those consulted by the committee, Carleton was
perhaps in the most certain frame of mind about the matter. He had formed his opinion about placing Indians on
reservations which
will be Islands: and as time elapses and the race
dies out, these Islands may become less and less,
until :finally, the great sea [of white men] will
engulf them one after another until they become
known only in history, and at length are blotted
out, of even that, forever. 4
8.
4.

s. J. c., 1867, p. 323-850.
Carleton to Doolittle, 7/25/65, A. G. 0., LS 43, p. 81.
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Since the Bosque Redondo would serve the purpose of an
"island" very well, there was no need to seek further for a
location. The committee, however, did not decide the issue.
The second line of inquiry into the situation in New
Mexico was due to the unsatisfactory condition in the Indian
service. The appointment of Delgado as superintendent had
been looked upon with misgivings by some of the citizens in
th~ Territory. Neither he nor three of the new agents could
keep their accounts or report to their superiors in the
English language .. This handicap made necessary the employment of assistants, sometimes in relation to business of
a confidential nature. The importance of party politics could
hardly permit such weak points on the battle front. As the
chief justice of the Territory pointed out, "Much, therefore
will rest upon the integrity and good faith of the clerks or
friends who· may be trusted in a confidential relation with
the officers in this portion of the Indian affairs." 5 Furthermore, Delgado did not furnish satisfactory reports about
conditions in New Mexico and the Washington office felt at
a distinct disadvantage in discharging properly its responsibility in the Territory. 6
Before taking any action the commissioner of Indian
affairs appointed Julius K. Graves in August, 1865, as commissioner and special agent to investigate the general situation in the superintendency. He was instructed to report on
the sufficiency of the Bosque Redondo as a reservation for
both the Navaho arid Apache, the cost of surveying the reservation for the purpose of allotting the land in severalty,
the character of the personnel in the Indian service, and the
practice of slavery. The expenditure of the congressional
appropriation of March, 1865, w~s placed in his hands. 1
5. Kirby Benedict to Dole, 6/12j65, B1158j65.
6. C. I. A, Annual ReJ!ort, 1865, p. 22.
The commission·s for the new agents appointed under Delgado were issued through
the chief justice of the Territory because the Washington office Jacked definite information as to whether the new superintendent had taken office. LB 77, p. 87.
7. Cooley to Dodd, 8/5/65, Cooley to Graves, 8/8j65. Valkenburgh to Graves,
9/12/65, LB 78, p. 6, 20, 179.

18

NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW

Graves made a thorough and detailed series of reports
in the spring of 1866. He philosophised about the status of
the Indians, condemned the practice of slavery or peonage,
recommended a shakeup in the service, and favored the
Carleton policy of keeping the Navaho at the Bosque
Redondo. His sympathies were distinctly with the Indians,
but he did not accord them a particularly favorable place in
the affairs of this world. He thought the star of the red man
was setting while that of the white man was rising. God had
so willed, and history could prove,
That the Indian under an all wise dispensation
of Providence was created for a specific purpose,
should mark his gradual decline seems evident
from their past history.
"They are fading-they are fading
In solemn gloom away
Like mists upon the mountain
At dawning of the day." 8
He echoed a rather common charge that most Indian
troubles were precipitated by actions of the white man,
and stated that the reservation plan by separating the two
groups was the proper solution to that problem.
The practice of enslaving Indian captives in New MexiCo was almost as old as the length of the white man's occupation. There were about 2,000 of them worth from $75 to
$400 each. Their treatment varied with the owners; some
were occasionally abused, others were adopted and tr~ated
as members of the family. The custom had long been recognized as one of the chief causes of the chronic warfare with
the Navaho. 9 The Indian bureau had made no effort to end
the evil on the ground that it lacked jurisdiction.l0 Since the
leading office-holders in the Territory held such slaves, they
naturally were not interested in operating the machinery of
local government to their own loss. But the situation was
8. Graves, Report, No. 3, Office of Indian Affairs.
9. Steck to Dole, 1/13/64, 8234/64, and Delgado to Dole, 7/16/65, D762/65.
Graves, Report, No. 3, 4, 10.
10. Dole to Arny, 6/26/63, LB 71, p. 81.
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incompatible with the results of the Civil War, and some
steps had been taken to remedy it. President Johnson issued
an order on June 9, 1865, for the suppression of the practice,
and the Freedmen's Bureau had been approached without
success to take charge of the captives.n Since these efforts
had resulted in little change, Graves recommended that
Congress take action, which it did in due time.12
The question of reorganization in the service occasioned
a slight disagreement. The removal of Delgado had been
urged upon the commissioner of Indian affairs by Delegate
Francisco J. Chaves, on the ground of "total incapacity" to
perform his work. This charge must be discounted a bit
because Chaves and Delgado were on opposite 'sides of the
political fence, but in addition to the language handicap,
other grounds were found for Cooley to recommend that the
superintendency be placed in the hands of Governor
Mitchell. The governor held certain military powers which
it was considered would be an aid in the management of
Indians, and the fusion of the two offices would eliminate
one sa,lary cost of $2,000. 13
Graves vigorously opposed combining the two offices
because "The Indian service in this quarter imperatively
demands the constant and unremitting efforts, care and
attention of a thorough going, practical and energetic man
-the whole time ... " 14 But he did recommend a general
shakeup for various reasons: Delgado should be removed
11. Andrew Johnson, 6/9/65, 11079/65. Valkenburg to 0. 0. Howard, 9/8/65,
LB 78, p. 162.
12. In Tomas Heredias v. Jose Maria Garcia, January, 1867, the Territorial
Supreme Court held that a contract under the territorial "Master and Servant" law
was involuntary servitude and therefore null and void. Gazette, 2/2/67.
By act of Congress, 3/2/67, peonage in New Mexico or elsewhere was declared
unlawful. Offenders were subject to a fine of $1-5,000 and 1-5 years imprisonment.
U.S. S. L., XIV, 546.
The Federal Grand Jury failed to indict a number of persons accused of holding
Navaho in bondage in the summer of 1868. The Daily N<n11 Mexican, 8/6/68.
General Sherman issued an order, 9/8/68, granting Indians the option of remaining with their "captors" or returning to their own people. Ibid., 9/23/68. This
was a reasonable solution to the problem, and many of the "captives" remained.
13. Cooley to Harlan, 1/17/66, RB 15, p. 47.
14. Graves to Cooley, 1/15/66, G22/66.

20

NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW

because of his language handicap; Diego Archuleta, who
had been reappointed to the Abiquiu agency, was accused of
having a bad reputation for honesty and integrity; Manuel
Garcia was not earning his salary, and M.S. Salazar of the
Ute agency was a zealous official but lacked judgment and
capacity. The Mexican agents in general had friends and
relatives who "hang on to the agency" and who appropriated the Indian goods. Theodore H. Dodd of the Navaho
agency was rated as competent. The traditional hostility
with the Indians was pointed out as a bar to the use of
Mexicans as agents. He condemned the practice of political
appointments, and, with the instinct of the reformer, he
recommended permanent tenure on good behavior and salaries adequate to attract competent men. 15
The Bosque Redondo, he believed, was a satisfactory
place for the Navaho, but ,not in company with the Apache
because of their traditional hostility; the water was all
right (despite former complaints to the contrary) ; pinon
wood for fuel as a substitute for the dwindling mesquite
could be secured about twenty-five miles to the north; the
Pecos valley provided excellent pasturage; the location was
remot~ from the mountainous retreats of the Indians; and
the mineral wealth in the old Navaho country could be exploited. In short, the prisoners should not be returned to
their former homes. Their fear of dwindling away in their
new environment was merely a superstition. In attributing
the visitations of measles to the unhealthy location they
failed to recognize that epidemics of that sort were "the
divine visitation of God for his own good purpose." Finding about 2,000 acres under cultivation, and that fruit trees
and vines had been set out, he believed that the experiment
of Carleton on the whole was successfuJ.l 6
The recommendation of Graves for a change in the personnel was promptly carried out. Colonel A. Baldwin Norton was commissioned superintendent in February, 1866.
15.
16.

Graves, Report, No. 4.
Graves, Report, No. 8.
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Delgado went through the formality of resigning his posi. tion, complaining of not having received the proper financial
support nor recognition during his tenure of office ;17 in fact,
Graves had practically superseded him in the control of
financial matters. Before the n~w incumbent arrived, Archuleta was suspended in April on the ground of misconduct
in office, 18 and Dodd was reaffirmed in May as agent to the
Navaho.
Dodd had come to New Mexico with Doolittle in the
summer of 1865 as agent for the Navaho, but his commission had been withheld temporarily because he disobeyed
instructions to visit Washington before proceeding to the
scene of his work. Carleton was troubled at that time by
the usual delay in forwarding goods for his charges. He
therefore sent Dodd back East "to see personally after these
important matters in which the health and comfort of 9,000
Indians-entirely dependent wpon the Governmelfl,t for
everything-are concerned."19 Despite his. exertions to hasten matters the train of goods started across the plains too
late in the season to complete the trip, so it wintered at Fort
Zarah, Kansas; however, necessary farm equipment for
spring planting was sent through by mule teams. 20
The Graves report, far from settling the Navaho question, seemed but the prelude to the working of diverse forces
which ultimately led to the abandonment of the Bosque Redondo. The question of transferring the Indians to the control of the department of the interior was debated, the military advocated their removal to the Indian Territory, and
internal affairs on the reservation went from bad to worse.
17. Delgado to President Johnson, 5/20/66, D319j66.
Occasionally an agent in New Mexico believed that he could be removed only by
the officer who signed his commission, the President of the United States. Delgado
probably acted und~r that theory.
18. Graves to Delgado, 2/24/66, G54/66. Cooley to General Geo. P. Este,
3/7/66, LB 79, p. 390.
19. Carleton to C. I. A., 8/6/65, A. G. 0., LS 15, p. 56. Cooley to Dodd, 8/5/65,
LB 78, p. 6.
20. Dodd to Cooley, 12/31/65, DSS/66.
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The expectations of Carleton that the prisoners would
be self-supporting within a year by farming had not been
realized. The cost to the department of war of subsisting
them for the eighteen months period from March 1, 1864, to
October 1, 1865, was $1,114,981.70. 21 This of course did not
include the expense of transportation nor the sums appropriated by congress and expended by the Indian bureau.
Since the army estimates for the year 1866-1867 were not
based on the continuation of this extraordinary expense,
the commissary general of subsistence, A. B. Eaton, raised
the issue of transferring the Navaho to the ·civil department. S'ecretary Harlan was not adverse, of course, to the
plan. The main plea for not assuming responsibility when
the first party of captives arrived in September 1863, had
been the lack of money to provide food1 for them. The remedy for that difficulty simply lay in congress appropriating
the necessary funds and having the civil officials do the
spending. 22
The system of double jurisdiction was also unsatisfactory. The military fed the captives, stood guard, and superintended the farming operations ; the Indian bureau
provided clothing and equipment. The Bosque Redondo was
not a military reservation, but was officially a reservation
for Indians. In cabinet discussion, Secretary Stanton urged
that the prisoners be transferred to the control of the
department of interior on the grounds that they would then
be under the proper jurisdiction, the military could resume
their primary duties, and stricter accounting and economy
could be enforced. Any requisitions that the agent might
make on the army subsistence department could be paid for.
This meant a return to the usual condition where the military aided the Indian service in emergencies, with the expectation of being reimbursed. The commissioner of Indian
affairs heartily concurred in the opinion of the secretary of
21. A. E. Shiras to Doolittle, 12/28/65, 181/66.
The cost per person per day varied from 21-4j5c to 33c, Il6lj66.
22. Eaton to Stanton, 12/27/65, 181j66 and 11/17/65, 188/66.
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war, expecting of course, "the cordial co-operation of the
military authorities, if their aid should be necessary." 23
The ord~r for the transfer of the Navaho to the control of the department of interior was issued on December
31, 1866, but, for several reasons, the actual change was
delayed until November 1, 1867. Superintendent Norton
was absent from New Mexico for several months because of
illness and no one was officially designated to act in behalf
of the civil department. Upon the return of Norton to his
duties in the summer, the new commander of the District of
New Mexico, Major General G. W. Getty, was not aware of
the existence of the order of December 31, 1866. When he
discovered it on September 30, the final step was delayed
untii the next regular date for issuing rations. 24 Agent Dodd
then accepted control of 7,111 Navaho from Major Chas. J.
Whiting and the military were finally relieved of their four
year burden.25
Superintendent Norton assumed the additional responsibility reluctantly. He had estimated the cost for the support of the Navaho at $600,000. Congress saw fit to appropriate only $100,000 "for subsistence and for the purchase
of sheep, seeds, agricultural implements" and a like sum for
23. L. V. Bogy to Browning, 12/7/66, RB 16, p. 56. Stanton to 0. H. Browning, 10/31/66, 0. I. A., I. D. File. Cooley to Harlan, 9/10/66, RB 15, p. 457.
The proposal was often advanced to transfer the control of Indian affairs to the
Department of War. An amendment to the Indian Appropriation bill to that effect
was defeated in the Senate by a vote of 24-13, February, 1867. Friction between
the military and civil officials, dishonesty. in the Indian service, and intermittent
Indian hostilities were among the reasons advanced for the change. The Territories
were opposed to this move, probably because it meant loss of political patronage and
opportunities to trade with the Indians. See Gong. Globe, 39 Cong. 2 sess. pt. 8, p.
1681-83, 1714f, 1717-20; and 1 sess. pt. 4, p. 3506-07.
24. Stanton to Browning, 1/23/67, C94/67; see also N159/67. Norton to Getty,
8/21/67, N159/67. Dodd to Norton, 3/15/67, N55/67.
New Mexico was reduced to a military district, 9/12/65, and assigned to the
Department of California. Due to Carleton's protest against the distant jurisdiction
of the commander at San Francisco, New Mexico was transferred to the Department
of Missouri, 10/10/65. A. G. 0., LS 15, p. 120, 132, 189.
Carleton was relieved from his command in New Mexico in September, 1866, and
succeeded by General George Sykes, who in turn was succeeded by Getty.
25. G89/67.
Crocker was transferred to the army of the Cumberland, March, 1865. BrevetMajor Henry B. Bristol had been post commander under Crocker and was transferred to New York, October, 1866.
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"relief,'' with the proviso that the department of war should
furnish no more rations after July 1, 1867.26 Obviously, in
the light of past experiences, the appropriation would last
for only a short time. Yet, the new task was taken in hand
and the lucrative contract for feeding the Navaho was
awarded to Elizah Simerly who assigned it to Perry Fuller
& Co. of Lawrence, Kansas. 27
The heyday of military domination of Indian affairs in
the Territory of New Mexico had now passed. The star of
Carleton had set and his experiment in civilizing the Navaho
on the Bosque Redondo reservation was doomed. Despite
his early irritation at the failure of Steck to take care of
the prisoners, he now feared that the transfer of. control
would result "in great injury to, if not in the positive failure of, the important measure of fixing forever the Navajo
tribe of Indians upon a reservation." 28 However, the fundamental cause of the defeat of his project was not to be found
in the change of jurisdiction, but in the internal conditions
at the Bosque Redondo.
In addition to the controversy between Steck and Carle- .
ton, there were four main reasons for the failure of the
policy of locating the Navaho on the banks of the .Pecos:
insufficient wood for fuel, crop failures, inadequate financial support, and hostility of the Comanche Indians. The
mesquite had been relied upon as the. fuel supply, but for
7,000 or more users it proved to be· insufficient. This pos26. Taylor to Otto, 5/25/67, RB 16, p. 830. Norton to Taylor, 10/4/67, N159j67.
U.S. S. L., XIV, .514.
.
Congress had appropriated the usual annual $100,000 the previous year, July,
1866.
27. F105/67.
During the absence of Norton in the spring of 1867, the commissioner of Indian
affairs had recommended that a special agent be appointed to investigate the problem of feeding the Navaho. Overruled quite properly by the secretary of interior
as unnecessary, Taylor appealed directly to the President without result. In complaining of the action of his superior, he stated that "it would have been better for
the service that such precedents should have been earlier established, as Special Agents
in cases far less urgent, and at large salaries have been very recently and from time to
time appointed within the few months during the administration of the present secretary." Taylor to President, 6/11/67, RB 16, p. 357; see also p. 347, 373.
28. Carleton to A. G., 2/11/66, 1161/66.

'
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sibility had been foreseen by Carleton, and among his early
instructions was the order to plant trees against the day of
the disappearance of the natural growth. From December
7, 1864, to April30, 1865, the Indians, under military supervision, planted 12,068 trees. 29 This measure, however, did
not produce soon enough. By 1867, the Indians were traveling five to eighteen miles away to secure fuel, carrying it
home on their backs. A one "man" load lasted but a short
time during the cold months; consequently, it was a constant
race to secure enough fuel to prevent suffering from the
cold and even freezing to death. The Navaho complained
about this situation and requested animal transportation to
better enable them to cope with the problem; the situation
became increasingly serious to the point that the ·superintendent finally wrote: "God knows what these indians will
do for fuel this winter-God only knows-It becomes scarcer
and farther off daily."so
The failure of the crops was particularly discouraging
because the success of. the colonization scheme was based
upon the theory of turning the Navaho into a farmer. The
first season the corn crop was almost entirely destroyed by
worms, and grasshoppers occasionally bothered the other
crops. Some of the land was too alkaline for cultivation.
Hailstorms at times and insufficient water added to the
troubles.· The lack of water was partly due to the difficulty
of turning the river into the irrigation ditches, the sandy
bottom of the Pecos being a treacherous foundation for a
29. s. J. c.. 1867, p. 322.
30. Norton to Mix, 11/11/67, N179/67. See also Norton to Taylor, 8/20/67,
N128/67 and 9/15/67, N153j67. Getty to Norton, 10/5/67, N165/67.
"Cole: "I am informed that many of them have perished from cold and from
other privations. I believe . . . . that they have suffered beyond all precedent almost
for the want of the necessaries of life, particularly for the want of shelter and fire."
Gang. Globe, 40 Cong. 2 seas. p. 2014, 3/20/68.
"Fuel was the only element not in abundance ; yet it was as abundant as at
any town or pueblo in the Territory, and the alleged scarcity would receive its proper
estimation by such comparison." Gwyther, "An Indian Reservationn in Overland
Monthly, X, 127 (Feb. 1873). This opinion can hardly be accepted at face value. The
villages in the mountains had access to abundant fuel, and the settlers in the Rio
Grande valley though less favorably situated for ··fuel were comfortably housed in
adobe structures for protection against the cold.
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diversion dam; a flood might sweep away such a structure
at a time when the need of water was greatest. 31
The problem of managing the farming activities was
also troublesome. In place of employing a sufficien.t number of experienced farmers to direct the labor of the
hundreds of Indian workers, a military officer was detailed
to superintend the work. This proved to be unsatisfactory,
either because of his lack of experience for such work or
because of a lack of interest; and, of course, some Navaho
were not inclined to work. To solve this difficulty, Dodd
recommended in the summer of 1866, that the farm land
be divided into ten acre plots with a practical farmer and
assistant in charge of each division. The Indians who desired to work would be settled on the edge of these plots
with a permanent home and personal garden plot. This
proposal was in keeping with the current idea of allotting
the land in severalty. 32 The plan was followed in certain
·respects the next year, but without appreciable results:
2367 acres were carefully ploughed and
planted . . This farm was divided into three sections, and each section was subdivided into tenacre fields. Over each of the three divisions a noncommissioned officer, with four private soldiers as
assistants, acted as superintendent, and eighteen
Indians performed the labor; the soldiers instructing and assisting them . . . Lieutenant McDonald
had entire control over all farming operations. 33
What with crop failures and a parsimonious (or dishonest) master, the Navaho were never adequately supplied with food or clothing. In spite of the efforts to make
31. Sykes to A. A. G., 4/9/67, A. G. 0., LS 43, p. 142. Getty to Norton, 10/5/67,
N165/67.
32. Carleton to A. G., 4/24/65, S. J. C., 1867, p. 224. Carleton to Sykes, 12/12/66.
A. G. 0., LS 43, p. 30. Norton, Annual Rewrt, 9/28/66, 39 Cong. 2 sess. Hse. Ex.
Doc. 1, II, 147 (1284). Dodd to Norton, 8/28/66, Ibid., p. 149-50.
33. McClure to Eaton, i2j9/67, 40 Cong. 2 sess. Hse: Ex. Doc. 248, XV, 2 (1341).
McClure also stated that the farm failed this season because of dryness, washing
away of the Pecos banks and consequent scanty water in the acequias, strong alkaline
water and soil. The result was rather discouraging, he wrote, but had taught the
Indians agriculture~ a first lesson in civilization.
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them self-supporting, they were absolutely dependent upon
the government for subsistence. This was a prime factor
in keeping them on the reservation; As Carleton wrote,
"The great magnet which really holds the Navajos fast to
the Reservation is the food which they get once in two days .
. . . They cluster around the commissariat like steel filings
around a loadstone . . . Now I believe they have no disposition to run away," except for a few vagabonds. 34 He
was probably wrong in his estimate of their disposition, .but
it was a long way to their old home and the military were
prompt in the early years in pursuing large parties that left.
The ration issued to the Navaho varied from threequarters to one pound of meat per day for each person and
a like amount of bread-stuff. The Indians were counted and
ration cards issued as they filed through a gate into a corral.
The cards at first were made of card-board. They were
sometimes lost and often forged. Stamped metal slips were
next used, but the clever Navaho craftsman made dies and
again forged them. At one time there were about 3,000 extra
ration tickets in existence. The situation was finally changed
by securing them from Washington with an intricate and
special design that could not be copied.35
I!J. regard to clothing, the well-known ability of the
Navaho in the art of weaving was not utilized for their
benefit. Instead of supplying the prisoners with flocks of
sheep in place of those taken as part of the spoils of the
roundup, cheap shoddy blankets, which provided but little
warmth and were quickly worn out, were purchased in the
East or· Middle West and transported at considerable expense to the reservation. Sometimes they were picked to
pieces and rewoven into a better article. In addition to the
poor quality, there was a lack of quantity. Granting that
congress was generous in appropriating money for clothing
and farm implements, whether the whole of the proceeds
34. · Carleton to Hancock, 1/23/67, A. G. 0., LS 43, p. 64.
85. Sykes to A. A. G., 4/9/67, Ibid., p, 42. Gwyther, "An Indian Reservation,"
in Overland Mon.thlu, X, 128 (Feb. 1878).
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would be spent in the interest of the Indian was another
question. And, as a matter of fact, it was not. 36
The final reason for the failure of the Bosque Redondo
experiment was the plains Indians. The Navaho had been
located on the western edge of the Comanche country.
These nomads (Comanches) had long been a source of
trouble to the white man, especially along the Texas frontier,
which was their special field for depredating. They found
a ready market for some of their spoils, particularly cattle,
through.trade with the New Mexicans in the eastern part
of the Territory. Through this channel they received guns
and ammunition, or hoop iron for making arrow heads,
and sometimes whiskey. The trade assumed extensive
proportions at times; about 700 traders were in the field in
1867 due to the practice of subletting licenses and the loose
manner of issuing the permits. It was suspected that some
of them who did not favor the Bosque Redondo reservation
incited the Comanche to attack their new neighbors. 37
Various steps were taken by the government to solve
this problem, not only for the sake of the Navaho but as a
part of the general attempt to control the Indian tribes. In
the summer of 1866, Norton revoked all permits for trading.
This proved to be only ·a temporary meas.ure. The following
year he sought an agreement with the Comanche for the
protection of the Navaho. A conference was held in Santa
Fe in September between representatives of the two groups,
but it produced no results. Two months later, when Agent
Labadie made a trip to the Texas Panhandle for another
interview, "They indignantly refused to m:ake any terms of
peace with the Navajos, and manifested their natural
36. Carleton to Hancock, 1/20/67, A. G. 0., LS 48, p. 60. Norton to Taylor,
9/15/67, N158/67.
Twenty years later it was written in regard to appropriations: "That the Indians get but little of it, as a rule, is so notorious that it is a standing joke in this
country." Dunn, Massacres of the Mountains, p. 15.
37. Norton to Cooley, 7j81j66, N65j66. P. H. Healy to Taylor, 7/31/67, N142/67.
At the time of capturing Peter Allison's train on the lower Cimarron Springs in
1864, the Comanche boasted that they would kill Carleton for giving their lands to the
Navaho. The New Mezican, 8/19/64.
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hatred toward them, saying that they would always fight
that tribe ..." 38
While the trials and tribulations at the Bosque Redondo were testing the courage of those in charge and wearing out the patience of the Navaho, a movement was started
for their transfer to some other locality. The use of the
reservation had been severely criticised from the beginning
of course, but in 1866 General Pope made a vigorous proposal that it be abandoned. In his opinion it was a mistake
to locate Indians on reservations in their own country because of friction with the incoming tide of white immigrants. This difficulty was illustrated, he thought, in the
conflict of opinion that had raged around the Bosque Redondo. He proposed that the Navaho be moved farther
east to the Indian Territory or to some other permanent
location in that general direction. This would result in
reducing the cost of subsistence due to the shorter distance
to the source of supplies, it would bring the Indians under
a more civilizing influence, fewer troops would be required
to guard them, and the frontier would be opened for settlement. He considered the Bosque Redondo to be the best
location at the time s.elected because it was the farthest point
east that Carleton was then able to take his prisoners. 39
Pope's idea of Indian country in regard to the Navaho
was certainly broad. The Bosque Redondo was a long way
from their old home. However, this assault on the reservation met with a cool reception in the department of interior,
although it found a ready welcome in the ranks of the military. General Sherman passed the responsibility for deciding the issue on to Washington with the remark, "This
is a matter of some importance, and is most costly. I think
we could better afford to send them to the 5th A venue Hotel
to b·oard, at the cost of the· U. 8." 40 The lateness of the
38.

Labadie, Report, December, 1867, in The Daily New Mezican, 8j14j68. Bell,

New Tracks in North America, p. 145£.
89. Pope to Sherman, 8/ll/66, 39 Cong. 2 sess. Hse. Ex. Doc. 1, III, 24!1' (1285),
40. Quoted in Stanton to Browning, 10/12/66, 0. I. A., I. D. File. See also
Harlan to Cooley, 8/13/66, 1525/66.
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season when the matter was discussed in Washington delayed any immediate action, but the stage was set for a
change. The P:resident instructed Secretary Browning to
mature plans for disposal of the Navaho, to be carried out
as soon as conditions would permit. The idea of seclusion
from contact with the whites, so common at the time, inftuenceq his opinion, and he recommended their removal to
the Indian Territory, stipulating, however, that it should be
done "with the consent of the removed." The idea of "consent" was to play an influential part in the final decision that
was yet to be made. 41
The proposal to transfer the Navaho to the Indian Territory was in keeping with a general plan to form one large
reservation south of the Arkansas River and concentrate
all the southern Indians on it. The northern Indians were
to be concentrated north of the Platte River. This scheme
was designed to open the country between the two rivers
to white travel and the construction of a transcontinental
railway. 42
The officials in New Mexico differed in their views
and with those of their superiors in Washington. John
Ward, one-time agent for the Navaho under Collins, recommended that they be returned to their old home. A line of
forts should then be constructed from the San Juan River
through Fort Wingate to Fort Craig. A bi-weekly patrol
between the posts would constitute a military barrier to
restrict the Navaho west of the line and would prevent the
illegal entry of white men into the Indian country. 43 Getty,
on the other hand, was of the opinion that the Indians could
be made self-supporting at the Bosque Redondo under certain conditions that had not been provided in the past, but
he suggested that they be located in the country east of the
Sacramento mountains, the home of the Mescalero Apache.
A prime factor in his opinion was a supply of fuel. 44
41.
42.
43.
44.

Grant to Browning, 10/13/66, 0. I. A., I. D. File.
Gong. Globe, 40 Gong. 1 sess. p. 667-70.
Ward to Norton, 12/20/66, N67j67.
Getty to Norton, 10/5/67, N165j67.
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Superintendent Norton held a conference with eleven
Navaho chiefs in September, 1867. They reiterated their
complaints, making it clear that they were not satisfied with
the Bosque Redondo. Events now began to move rapidly
toward a crisis. That same month the Comanche raided and
killed nine Navaho, besides capturing two women. The
soldiers failed to catch the marauders, and the Navaho were
not properly armed to punish them decisively. This episode
on top of their accumulated woes developed a strong spirit
of unrest among them. A party estimated from 200 to 250
deserted the reservation on the 26th and 27th. Norton immediately sought permission from Washington to issue 4,000
Mexican blankets to quiet the others, a step that was
promptly approved by wire. 45
The quick action of Norton in meeting the delicate situation in September was only a stop-gap, and the crucial
question of what to do with the Navaho was yet unanswered.
He strongly favored the policy of removal: "Justice, humanity, Christianity, and the welfare of the Indians. The safety
of the whites, and the pecuniary interests of the government
all demand the change." But where? He analyzed the proposals of Ward and Getty. If removed to their old country
they could be made self-sustaining within one year, while
it would take four years at an estimated expenditure of
$700,000 to accomplish the same result if the proposal of the
military commander was followed. The immediate pecuniary
advantage of the suggestion of Ward was outweighed finally
by the belief that the Fort Stanton area would make possible
a much sought after goal; namely, the protection of the
whites against the Indians for all future time because of its
remoteness from the settlements, 46 a rather unsound argument.
The spirit of Carleton still hovered over the office of
Indian affairs. Perhaps the Bosque Redondo experiment
45. Dodd to Norton, 9/11/67, N155j67. Norton to Taylor, 9/15/67, N153j67.
Dodd to Norton, 9/29/67, N161/67. Norton to Mix, 10j10j67, T139/67. See also
report of council with the Navaho, 7/15/66, N66j67.
46. Norton to Taylor, 10/19/67, N169j67.
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could be carried on to success under the management of the
Indian bureau with proper support from congress. And by
no means should the Navaho be allowed to return to their
former homes where the old game of hide-and-seek with
the military would have to be played again. The "good of
the Indians, the safety of the white settlers in their vicinity,
and the general prosperity of the Territory ..." forbade
such a move. This view was clinched with the stock argument that it was cheaper to feed them than to fight them. 47
While the officials were proposing, other forces were
disposing. The Navaho owning horses planned to steal away
during the winter. In the month of January, 1868, 250 to
300 were estimated to have left. 48 Contemporary with this
movement, the Indian Peace Commission was recommending to congress that a treaty be made with the Navaho, or
their consent obtained in some other way, for their removal
to the southern Indian district "where they may soon be
made self-supporting." 49 Their proposal carried force because the cost of feeding the Indians weighed heavily with
congress and that will-o' -the-wisp; "self-support," might yet
be attained if prompt measures were taken :
We are paying now for the subsistence of
seventy-five hundred Navajo Indians in New Mexico. We have for the last five years issued to them
rations costing us $750,000 per year, and it is likely
to cost us that amount of money again this year
unless we remove the Indians somewhere. 50
Congress followed the advice of the commission and
intrusted it with the task of settling the Indians on some
permanent reservation, the earlier instructions of President
Grant becoming the basis of the plan. Inspector-General
47. Taylor to Browning, 2/21/68, RB 17, p. 168. C. I. A., Annual Report, 1867,
p. 12.
48. Dodd to Norton, 12/7/67, N197j68. A. Rosenthal to Captain Henry Davis.
2/1/68, D990/68.
49. 1/7/68, 40 Cong. 2 sess. Hse. Exec. Doc. 97 ( 1337).
50. Henderson, 3/10/68, in Cony. Globe, 40 cong. 2 sess. pt. 2, p. 1789.
The cost of subsisting the Navaho from 11/1/67 to 5/23/68 was $280,830.07.
Dodd to Sherman & Tappan, 5/30/68, R. C. D. No. 63, p. 304-06.
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R. B. Marcy had been requested by· Sherman to render a
report on the country lying between the 98th and lOlst
parallels, the Canadian River on the north and the Red .
River on the south. Marcy selected a site for a Navaho
reservation between the Wichita Mountains and the Red
River. The Indians could become self-supporting there
within two or three years, he believed. Sherman doubted
that a reservation in their old country could be permanent
because of the rising tide of miners pushing into western
Colorado and northwestern New Mexico; so, "with the light
now before me, I would prefer their removal to a point north
of the Red River, west of the Chickasaw line and east and
south of the Wichita mountains." 51
The commission empowered Sherman and Tappan to
proceed to New Mexico and negotiate a treaty with the
Navaho for their removal. The two delegates left for the
Territory in May with the idea in mind that there was no
use in moving the Indians unless they were located east of
the 98th paralleL But at Trinidad, Colorado, Sherman dispatched a note to Getty to meet with them at Fort Sumner
and "to bring with me [him] one or more who are familiar
with the old Navajo Country, west of the Rio Grande." 52
The two commissioners to the Navaho surveyed the
scene at the Bosque Redondo and consulted with Getty,
Dodd, and others. 53 On May 29 and 30 they held councils
with the Navaho. Three propositions were laid before the
Indians as the basis of the discussion: they could settle anywhere as citizens in the Territory of New Mexico, remove to
the region of the lower Canadian and Arkansas rivers, or
discuss the advisability of returning to their old country.
Needless to say, the last one was seized upon as the choice,
which was in keeping with their attitude for the past year.
They had refused to plant crops and had petitioned their
51. Indian Peace Commission, Proceedings, 4/1/68, Ibid. Marcy to Sherman,
3/30/67, 0. I. A., I. D. File.
52. Getty to A. A. G., 5/23/68, A. G. 0., LS 43, p. 530. Sherman to Browning,
4/28/68. 8566/68. Indian Peace Commission, Proceedings, 4/6/68, in 0. I. A., I. D.
File.·
53. Norton died, 1/10/68.
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agent to return them to their old home until Dodd was convinced that they would never be contented elsewhere. S'everal
other factors influenced the commissioners to satisfy the
longings of the Indians: the secretary of interior had been
lukewarm toward the proposition to move them farther east;
peonage had been abolished in New Mexico, thus removing
a chronic cause of war with the Navaho; their old country
"is unoccupied, is utterly unfit for white civilization, and
towards which they yearned as the Swiss for their native
mountains;" and "Without absolute force they will not remain here or immigrate further east. 54
As the military had moved the Navaho from their tribal
home to the Bosque Redondo, the military moved them back.
In both cases action was taken under the war powers. Without waiting for the formality of treaty ratification by the
senate, Sherman issued the order for their removal on June
1: "Until congress makes provisions to carry out the terms
of our treaty, as the military commander on this frontier, I
authorize and instruct you to put these people in motion for
their own country. 55 But where the removal under the direction of Carleton had been based on the will of the white
man, the action of Sherman and Tappan was based on the
desires of the Indians. In both cases there were people who
questioned the wisdom of the 'decision. In anticipation of
criticism of the action now taken, Tappan vigorously pointed
out that the Navaho
have been prisoners of war to all intents and purposes, and the person who for selfish pecuniary and
political purposes is responsible for such inhuman
treatment of these Indians as that of keeping them
for nearly four years upon such a reservation deserves the condemnation of the people, the severest
and most ignominious penalties of violated law. To
have compelled them to remain "would have forced
upon them the horrors of Andersonville and ren54. Sherman
(1345). Sherman
5./29/68, R. C. D.
No. 63, p. 304-06.
55. Sherman

to Henderson, 5/30/68, 40 Cong. 2 sess. Hse. Ex. Doc. 308', XIX
to Browning, 6/1/68, R. C. D. No. 63, p. 299. Council, Proceedings,
No. 63, p. 301. Dodd to Sherman and Tappan, 5/30/68, R. C. D.
to Getty, 6/1/68, R. C. D. No. 63, p. 307.
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dered our government infamous ... Navajoe men,
women, and children were compelled in mid winter,
to travel on foot over a bleak plain, from twelve
to thirty (12 to 30) miles to dig from a hard soil,
the mesquite root and pack it on their shoulders
back to prison ... " Sherman acted promptly, with
judgment and humanity as military commander in
a crisis "when as commissioners we were powerless-not hesitating to assume responsibility." It
was a most infamous crime ever to have removed
them. 5 6
In contrast to ·the unwilling trek eastward under
duress, with a past history of war and depredation, they
now returned westward willingly with the desire to live in
peace with their white neighbors. Five years of enforced
restraint at the Bosque Redondo had impressed upon them
more strongly the wisdom of adhering closely to some of
the demands of their conquerors. They even acquired a
reputation of having destroyed and stolen less on the return march than a column of soldiers of like number would
have done. Only one complaint was registered against
them; the thief was punished by order of Barboncito, being
tied to the end of a wagon and forced to walk. 57
Major Whiting was placed in charge of the Navaho
migration, a ten-mile long procession moving westward to
Albuquerque by way of San Jose and Tijeras Canyon. Seven
days were spent in crossing the Rio Grande. They arrived
at New Fort Wingate on July 22 after a trip of thirty-five
days. Dodd then assumed charge and the Indians eventually spread back into the hills and mesas of their old home.
The government spent about $56,000 on the removal from
Fort Sumner, but the dream of Navaho self-sufficiency was
not yet attained, many more dollars being yet to be spent
in the next decade. 5 s
Tappan to Browning, 6/20/68, 0. I. A., I. D. Files.
Davis to Taylor, 9/15/68, 40 Cong. 3 sess. Hse.. Ex. Doc. 1, II, 619-21 (1366).
The Daily Neto Me!l>ican, 7/10/68.
58. Getty to Gen. C. McKeever, 7/14/68, A. G. 0., LS 43, p. 591, see also p,
537, 538; Getty to Whiting, Ibid., p. 536. McClure to Mix, 10/7/68, M1964/68. H. M.
Davis to Mix, 10Jl4J68, W1090/68. Wm. Rosenthal to Davis, 7/24/68, W967/68.
Hunter to Whiting, 7/12/68, A. G. 0., LS 43, p. 589. The Daily Ne11• Me!l>ican,
7/10/68'.
56.
57.
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IV

THE NAVAHO DENOUEMENT

The treaty signed with the Navaho at Fort Sumner on
June 1, 1868, can be summarized briefly: the Navaho agreed
to surrender their bad men for punishment under the laws
of the white man; their reservation was to extend from the
37th parallel of latitude southward to an east-west line
through old Fort Defiance, and from a north-south line
through Bear Spring westward to longitude 109° 30' including the "outlet of the Canon-de-chilly" ; various buildings were to be erected at a total cost of $11,500; the agent
was to reside at the agency; farm land could be secured in
severalty at the rate of 160 acres for each head of a family
and eighty acres for each male adult; financial aid should
be extended to individual proprietors to a maximum of $150
expended over a period of three years; education was compulsory between the ages of six and sixteen ; annuity goods
were promised for ten years at a maximum cost of $5.00
per Indian, and $10.00 per person was granted to those who
engaged in agricultural and mechanical pursuits; the
Navaho were permitted to hunt on unoccupied land adjacent
to the reservation; they agreed to grant a right-of-way for a
railroad; three-fourths of the adult males must ratify any
proposed cession of tribal lands; individual owners of land
could be dispossessed only by their consent; and $150,000
was provided to cover the cost of removal, subsistence for
the first winter, and for the purchase of sheep and goats
to a value of $30,000 1 •
The treaty had certain weak points. In the first place,
it was predicated on the fundamental error that the Navaho
were destined to become a settled, agricultural people, the
same idea that Carleton had in mind in his Bosque Redondo
experiment. On the contrary, they were more interested
in raising sheep and accumulating horses than in following
the life of a farmer. When at Fort S'umner, they had re1.

Kappler, II, 1015-19.
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quested repeatedly a supply of sheep to rebuild their greatly
reduced flocks. The governm!'lnt, however, had sent them
farming implements and eastern-made goods.
In keeping with the above policy the lines of the reservation were drawn to include the rich San Juan valley on
the north. On the other hand the east and west boundaries
were cramped together and the southern boundary placed
so far north that parts of the old tribal range were excluded.
This part of the treaty was soon a dead letter. The Navaho
refused to venture north of the San Juan River because of ·
the Ute barrier. On. the other three sides they blithely
ignored the boundary lines and grazed their stock where
forage could be found.
The temptation to wander off the reservation was further strengthened by the provision for hunting on unoccupied adjacent land. This concession was designed to supplement the Navaho economy until the game had disappeared
or the white settlers had occupied the region. General
Sherman gave it a flexible interpretation at the time the
treaty was signed: "You can go outside the line to hunt.
You can go to Mexican towns to trade, but your farms and
homes must be inside the boundary line, beyond which you
have no claim to the land." 2
The second unsound assumption was the belief that
the Navaho would be self-supporting after the first year.
Tl;le appropriation provided for in the treaty covered subsistence then for one year only. This same will-o'-the-wisp
had tantalized the government for the preceding. five years,
and it continued to beguile them. The Navaho had been selfsupporting before the Carleton round-up, but they were
then plentifully supplied with sheep; now it would take time
to build up their flocks again. Meanwhile the lack of sufficient food because of their small flocks, crop failures, a
parsimonious government, and unwise expenditure of funds,
·
·
continued to be a chronic complaint. ·
Thus the return of the nomads to their old home did
not solve immediately the problem of their management.
2.

Council with the Navaho, 5/29/68, R. C. D. No. 63,

p,

301.
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For the next ten years the government was faced with difficulties of making them self-supporting, and of adjusting
their reservation limits to their natural habits. In addition
to these the dying embers of their old marauding habits
bothered the settlers for some time and certain reforms in
the Indian service did not produce the millenium in management.
Efficiency in management was sought by a radical
shakeup in the Indian service. The Indian peace commission of 1867 recommended, because of the corruption that
had crept into Indian affairs through party politics and the
natural greed of man, that congress fix a date not later than
February 1, 1869, for the removal of all superintendents and
agents. Those who had proved faithful and competent could
be reappointed; the unworthy, of cour:se, would be eliminated permanently. They further recommended the old
division of responsibility: the civil department should have
the task of civilizing the Indians, the military should take
charge of hostiles. a
Public opinion favored the reform movement and the
shakeup in personnel in New Mexico occurred in 1869. Two
sources were drawn upon by the government for selecting
the new appointees: religious bodies and the army. The
Quakers had petitioned the president "for a more liberal
and attentive consideration of the welfare of the Indians
than had recently been given to the subject by his immediate
predecessors." They· were consequently called upon to accept responsibility for the Indian tribes in Kansas, N ebraska, and a part of Indian Territory. The army was
given the responsibility of the other tribes. This was in
keeping with the arguments long advanced that the army
could manage the Indians with greater economy and with
more integrity than could the bureau of Indian affairs. 4
3. Indian Peace Commission, 1867, Papers, 0. I. A., I. S. P., Drawer No. 6.
4. S. I., Annual Report, 1869, 41 Cong. 2 sess. Hse. Ex. Doc. 1, III, x (1414).
C. I. A., Annual Report, 1869, p. 5, Ibid., 1870, p. 10. Colyer to Lowrie, in B. I. C.,
Report, 1870, p. 93-94.
Tribune (New York) in The Daily New Mexican, 5/19/69;
Ibid., 5/22/69.

THE FEDERAL INDIAN POLICY

39

The use of the army officers did not prove popular in
certain quarters. Vincent Colyer, -the energetic secretary
of the board of Indian commissioners, opposed their employment on the ground that it was "simply policing the
Indians, not reclaiming or· civilizing them." This view was
finally accepted by congress and the army appointees were
retired from their positions in 1870. To fill the vacancies
other religious bodies were called upon to follow the example
of the Quakers. As a result, the Navaho were entrusted to
the care of agents approved by the Presbyterian board for
foreign missions. 5 Despite the new policy the Navaho
agency was a scene of too frequent changes in agents and
complications due to other disturbing factors for a decade
following the abandonment of the Bosque Redondo.
Under verbal instructions from Sherman and Tappan,
and to conform to the terms of the treaty, Dodd recommended that the agency be located at Fort Defiance. It was
a suitable location from the standpoint of timber, grazing,
and farm lands for the agency, and nearness to the cultivated area in the Canyon Bonito, where many of the Indians would settle. 6 With the agency located, Dodd's work
for the Navaho was terminated by death from paralysis, on
January 16, 1869.7
A series of rapid changes in agents now followed.
Henry Wood Dodd, a brother of the former agent, was
placed in temporary charge until French arrived from the
Abiquiu agency. The switch to army officers then followed
and Captain F. A. Bennett assumed control in August,
1869. 8 Bennett was followed by James H. Miller in January, 1871, when the policy of using army officers had been
dropped. Miller was murdered by a band of Ute Indians
about 100 miles northwest of his agency in June, 1872, and
W. F. Hall next held the position until relieved by W. F. M.
5. B. I. C., Report, 1870, p. 95, Colyer to Lowrie, in B. I. C., Report, 1870, p.
93-94. Colyer to Rev. Mr. Anthony, 6/25/70, Ibid., p. 95.
6. Dodd to Taylor, 8/4/68, D1412j68. Dodd to Webb, 8/5/68, W988/68.
7. The Daily New Mexican. 1/23/69.
·
8. Gallegos to H. W. Dodd, 1/23/69, D259/69 and G26/69. Clinton to Parker,
8/18/69, C418/69.
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Arny in September, 1873. 9 Under Arny's administration
complications developed which led the Navaho to drive him
off the reservation.
This violent termination to Arny's career with the
Navaho was due to two factors: the squaw-men, and the
personality of Arny. The squaw-man was a power to be
reckoned with. 10 Through proficiency in the Indian tongue
and long residence they acquired an influence which sometimes was greater than that of the agent. Upon assuming
charge at Fort Defiance, Arny had discharged two squawmen employees, Thomas V. Keams and Du Bois, because he
believed they had acquired an inimical influence over the
Navaho. Perhaps, in this case, the agent misjudged his
men, and certainly the act did not smooth the way for him
at his new post. Furthermore, he laid himself open to suspicion on the part of the Indians, a fact which was taken
advantage of by these opponents to weaken his authority.
Arny was a combination of the idealist and realist.
He was a territorial politician interested in the welfare of
the nomads, provided they did not impede the economic development of the territory and the advancement of his own
interests. Verbose in speech ~nd writing, sometimes to the
point of bombast and at other times with a tendency toward
vagueness, he aroused the distrust of his associates and yet
maintained his political strength in Washington. Whether
he was afflicted with the weakness of peculation may be
questioned, but he probably was.
In the summer of 1875, he departed for a trip to Washington with a party of his wards. During his absence the
Indians drove away the agency employees and refused to
9. Pope to Walker, 6/16/72, P905/72. See also H93/72 and D575j73.
10. "All the intercourse between the Government and the Indian is filt"red
through these men and partakes of their character, being full of duplicity, treachery,
and evasions. In all the length and breadth of the plains there is not an interpreter
that can be relied on ; and no treaty or delicate mission should ever be undertaken
without several interpreters, who, moreover, should be required to give each his interpretation out" of hearing of the others. There are in the United States about HJO
Indian reservations and agencies, at each of which there is an average of about ten
of these squaw men. . . . They are an injury to the country, a detriment to the
Indian, and should be _!lbolished." Dodge, Hunting Grounds, p. 428.

THE FEDERAL INDIAN POLICY

41

permit him to return to his position. This act was the cul. mination of the attempt to get rid of the agent, first started
by petition in May for his removal on the grounds of loss of
faith in him and because of his peculations. Since the attitude of the Indians was so threatening, Arny tendered his
resignation in August. General Sherman recommended that
it be accepted in order to quiet the Navaho, advice that was
followed by the secretary of interior and Dr. Lowrie of the
Presbyterian board. 11 The military took charge of the
agency in September until a successor to Arny could be
appointed.
Irvine was transferred from the Cimarron agency and
arrived at Fort Wingate in December. He had made a good
record as an honest and forceful agent, but the new scene
of labor was not regarded as a sinecure by contemporary
opinion:
How he will succeed under greater responsibilities among a nation of breech-clouted brutes,
removed to the mountains beyond the pale of civilization, with bad white men clinging to the borders of the reservation, we must· confess is quite
problematic in the light of past experience.12
He succeeded well enough, but resigned in July, 1877. If no
"side" money was made, the salary of an agent was hardly
sufficient for support; he had spent about $800 per year of
his own money.l 3
John E. Pyle was the next agent to serve the Navaho.
He was commissioned in December and arrived at his post
of duty in April, 1878. The chronic difficulty of eliminating
liquor from the reservation faced him, but the problem of
attaining economic self-sufficiency for the Indians had been
pretty well solved. He was able to report that by farming
and grazing the Indian had "attained to a condition virtually
11. See correspondence in A581j75, 11148/75, 11574/75, L376j75; LB 126, p. 325.
Grand Jury, Report, 2nd Judicial District, Albuquerque, 10/9/75, C155j76. C. I. A.
Annual Report, 1875, p. 330-32. RB 28, p. 99. Weekly New Mexican, 10/5/75.
12. Weekly New Mexican, 10/5/75. Price to Blair, 12/9/75, W62/76.
13. Sheldon Jackson tu Trowbridge, 4/24/80, 1251/80. See also LB 136, 395.
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independent of government aid." 14 This long sought objective, however, had not been attained without difficulty.
The treaty provided for subsistence during the first
winter and $30,000 worth of sheep and goats. A difference
of opinion over the most advantageous time for purchasing
the sheep delayed the fulfillment of that part of the treaty
until the fall of 1869, but the realization of the long hopedfor restoration of their flocks was a happy moment of the
returned exiles.. The agent reported: "I have never seen
more anxiety and gratitude displayed than was shown by
these people during this issue." 15 However, this happy
occasion found the Navaho far from being self-supporting.
The peace-loving idealist Colyer could report that
The usual story of useless goods purchased
and forwarded at immense expense, by wagon,
thousands of miles; of moneys appropriated for
building school houses, blacksmith's shops, etc.,
etc., yet never erected; of promises of cattle and
sheep to be furnished, yet never forwarded, applies
to the Navajoes as weii as to many other tribes. 16
The charge was literally true in some respects, but the
officials were striving to improve the situation. They still
had a healthy respect for the marauding ability of the
nomads and they knew from experience the cost of military
campaigns; consequently, they strove earnestly to maintain the peaceful mood in which the vast majority of the
'Navaho had arrived home.
The old refrain, "it was cheaper to feed than fight,"
was the caii to action. When the finances of the Indian
bureau were exhausted by the fall of 1869, the military
came to the rescue; General Sherman turned over the balance of $33,000 from a special fund,H and instructions were
issued to "urge upon Capt. Bennet~ the necessity of exercising the most rigid economy .... " 18 The military frequently
14. Pyle to Commissioner, llj8j78, Pl137/7S, and P240J78; LB 142, 10.
15. Bennett, Report, 8/19/70, 41 Cong. 3 sess. Hse. Ex. Doc. 1, I, 612 (1449).
16. Colyer, in C. I. A., Annual Report, 1869, p. 90.
17. Sherman to Getty, 11/26/69, W770/70.
18. Parker to Clinton, 11/27 j69, LB 93, 168. Sherman to Getty, 11/26/69,
W770/70.
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granted aid in emergencies for several years more, but the
Navaho had lean pickings. Crop failures and tardy government aid often brought th~m to the verge of starvation. In
the winter of 1874, food issues were made to some of them
in their hogans because of physical weakness which prevented their presence at the distribution; more often, however, they clustered around the agency seeking relief from
their hunger. The variety of goods issued was usually bartered away, frequently for sheep, sometimes for articles of
little value. Through the several business transactions involved in translating the money appropriation of the government into tangibles for the use of the Navaho, the true
value of the aid was never realized. 19
In the midst of their trials most of the Navaho practiced self-restraint, but some indulged in petty thieving
around the agency and general stealing at more distant
points. The legal right to hunt off the reservation and the
granted right to trade in the settlements afforded abundant
occasion for misbehaving, and the opportunities were sometimes taken advantage of, particularly when hunger urged
them on. 20 They ventured as far eastward as the Comanche
19. Bennett to Clinton, 8/10/70, C1596. Miller to Pope, 7/20/71, P386-71.
Dudley to Smith, 2/21/74, D206/74, and Dudley to Arny, 6/4/74, A470j74.
20. "San Ildefonso, July 13, 1869
"Editors New Mexican :
"On the morning of the 7th ultimo, I left the Rio Grande to go to the Valles
when I expected to catch plenty of trout and work some on the new land. I arrived ,
at Santa Rosa at nightfall, and as soon as I arrived there we tried to bring in the •
horse herd, but could not get them to come near the corral, and left them in the
woods. Early next morning we found that herd had been driven off by Indians, and
:followed the trail immediately after them; before sundown we came up to where they
had killed a filly and two mares, the last one sweating yet. Night brought us in
sight of them, but an awful thunderstorm hindered us from retaking the herd, and
as bad luck had it one of our guns went off accidentally, which alarmed the Indians
and they went off flying. Not having taken· anything to eat with us we returned to
camp and awaited asaistance from the settlements. Our folks not arriving before
Friday we could not start until Saturday the 12th, being then only seven of us and
on foot. We followed the trail until Tuesday the 16th, near the Ojo del Espiritu
Santo, where five of the party lost their courage and returned, leaving. myself and '
an old man named Jose Miguel Muiiis alone on the war path.
"Not thinking it prudent to follow the trail, we went over to the new government
road on the Rio Puerco, and followed it up to New Fort Wingate, where we reported
ourselves· to CoL Evans, commanding the post, but were unable to get an escort.
We then followed on to Fort Defiance and laid our claim before the Indian Agent,
Major French, and on the same day, the 23rd, we had the good luck to find one of
the animals stolen-a mule belonging to Jose Miguel Muiiis, my compani~n. But this
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country and westward to the Mormon settlements in southeastern Utah.
The Navaho at large had raided the Mormons occasionally during the period of the Bosque Redondo exile, and after
the return home, in November of 1869, those people were
harassed again. The next month the agent called the chiefs
into council, at which they promised to break up such expeditions of the younger men. The threat of loss of annuity
goods was an additional incentive to their natural desire to
avoid a repetition of the former drastic action of the
government. 21
Bu.t it. wasn't always necessary for the ladrones to seek
far distant fields, 22 and it was the losses experienced by the
settlers in the Rio Grande, that old time scene of depredations, that led the citizens to resort to their retaliatory raids
and the territorial government to exert its power. There
was no law under which the ·governor could call out the
militia, but Acting-Governor Heath recommended that the
21. Brig. Gen. Erastus Snow to Capt. R. N. Fen.ton, 11/17/69, F205/69. Parker
to Clinton, 11/29/69, LB 92, p. 479. Bennett to Clinton, 12/23/69, C788/69. Clinton
to Parker, 1/17/70, C863/70.
22. Miller to Pope (Superintendent), 3/21/72: "I have the honor to state that
the chiefs report to me that citizens of this Territory are grazing their sheep herds
within a short distance of this reservation. I respectfully request that they be publicly notified of the grea~ risk they are running by herding so near the Indian camps
as the Indians being hungry, and I having no rations to issue them, it is a great inducement for them to steal, which they will certainly do before they will starve."
The Daily New Me.,ican, 4/4/72.
·was all the agent could do for us; leaving thereby, after the three killed on the.road,
twenty eight horses and mules in possession of the Navajos. Saturday we turned
homeward, and after eight days of hard travel arrived here on Saturday evening the
3d instant.
"The report of this depredation has been made to Ron. J. M. Gallegos, Superintendent of Indian affairs, but whether the government will ever give us any satisfaction, after proving by the mule we took from the Indians that the Navajos were
the thieves, we have yet to find out. Col. Evans, at New Fort Wingate, the only post
in the Navajo country, says that he has not a hundred men for service. Fort Defiance, the seat of the Indian Agent, is not protected to [at] all, and is entirely at
the mercy of the Indians. Whose fault this is I cannot say, but think this state of
things should be remedied. Here we are on the frontier, left on foot, without protection, and not even allowed to get up a party to chastise the Navajos who are at
present scattered all over the country in marauding parties:·
The Daily New Me.,ican, 7/16/69.
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citizens arm themselves for self-protection and offered to
supply a limited amount of guns. This action was followed
by Governor Mitchell's issuance of a proclamation on August
2, 1869, that all Navaho off the reservation would be treated
as outlaws and punished as common enemies where found
unless accompanied by a military: escort.23
The action of the governor did not meet with the approval of the federal officials. It was in con·flict with the
current arrangement of jurisdiction whereby the Indians
on a reservation were under the control of the civil department and off the reservation under the military. Furthermore, it would have the effect of reviving the old practice
of raiding the Navaho, ostensibly to recover stock but practically to secure additional plunder, and it was feared that.
such raids would eventually lead to a general out-break.
Consequently, prompt action was taken to counteract the
proclamation. Superintendent Clinton and General Getty
consulted with the new governor, William A. Pile, who proceeded to ignore Mitchell's action as of no validity or effect.
Pressure was also exerted at Washington and formal instructions to Pile to annul the action of his predecessor were
issued from the state department. 24
On the whole, it was believed by responsible officiais
that the Navaho were desirous of peace, but it was recognized that it was hard for a hungry man to refrain from
stealing. It was doubly desirous, ·therefore, to keep them
fed when the crops failed. For the next several years,
occasional thefts occurred, and the citizens organized posses
to recover the plunder. The military also acted at times for
the same purpose, and the Navaho chiefs helped to end the
practice. When the Indian leaders were able to recover the
plunder, they turned it in at the agency. 25
23. Heath to John T. Russell, 7/14/68, 40 Cong. 3 sess. Hse. Ex. Doc. 1, II,
639-40 (1366). New Mexico, Executive Records, 1867-82, p. 35.
24. Clinton to Parker, 8/26/69, C436j69. Parker to Clinton, 8/16/69, LB 92,
p. 73.
25. "l am confident that . . . nothing short of starvation would induce them to
commence hostilities of any kind. I also believe that most of the people of this
Territory are waiting anxiously for, and would take advantage of any opportunity
to get the Navajos into trouble." Bennett to Clinton, 12/16/69, 0772/69.
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To further the efforts to control the few troublesome
members of the tribe, Superintendent Pope organized a
body of Indian police in the summer of 1872. One hundred
Navaho were selected from the thirteen bands and placed
under command of Manuelito, subject to the orders of the
agent. Their duties were to patrol the boundary and recover stolen stock. Paid from $5.00 to $7.00 a month, their
worth was quickly proved and stealing decreased rapidly.
As a result, Agent Hall recommended that they be disbanded, a move which was approved at Washington and
carried out in August, 1873.26
With the return of material prosperity and the pressure
upon the ladrones to cease their operations, the Navaho;
within a decade after their return home, had lost their
century old character of a menace to the white man's development of New Mexico. They were no longer to be feared
because
They have too much at stake in their immense
herds of sheep, goats, horses, and cattle, their hundreds of thousands of pounds of grain in the field
and the cache, to hazard it in a war with a powerful nation. Since their experience as prisoners of
war at Bosque Redondo they want no more war. 27
But other problems still remained. The attainment of
economic well-being and a reputation of pacifism had been
accompanied by an increase in population, which made more
apparent than ever the inadequacy of their reservation.
As noted above, the Navaho had not observed the boundary lines marked out in the treaty. On the western side,
26. Pope to Walker, 8/27/72, P117/72. Hall to.Dudley, 12/16/72, D191/72 and
7/19/73, D405/73. Arny to Smith, 9/5/73, D647f73.
"The evidence is abundant that in every tribe the selection of a small number of
Indians by the agent, to be instructed and disciplined by him as a constabulary
force, would prove a safe and effective means of preserving ord~r. and of assisting
the tribe in enforcing among themselves their treaty obligations." B. I. C., Annual
Report, 1874, p. 9.
27. Pyle to Commissioner, 8/3/78, 45 Cong. 3 sess. Hse. Ex. Doc. 1, IX, 605
(1850).
"Of the Navajoes it is hardly necessary to speak. They have passed out of the
list of Indians hostile, or likely ever to be so." General Pope in Weekly New Mexican,
10/30/77.
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they reoccupied the good grazing grounds of the Mesa
Calabaza, some seventy miles beyond the true reservation.
Furthermore, the meaning of "canyon" had caused trouble
on that side because it was interpreted differently by the
two parties to the treaty. Sherman had used the word in the
sense of a narrow defile; the Indians, when the word was
applied to the Canyon de Chelly, used it to include the wider
area along the lower reaches of the Rio de Chelly. On the
eastern side of the reservation they likewise wandered
beyond the boundary line with their flocks, and the remnants of the Sandoval band, now under the command of
Guero, reoccupied their old haunts near Cebolleta, northeast
of Mt. Taylor.28
The first move to modify the original boundaries of the
reservation was taken by Arny in 187 4. He badgered the
Navaho into negotiating an agreement whereby they surrendered a strip of land along the northern side between the
37th parallel and a line running west from the junction of
the San Juan River with the eastern boundary. In return
for this cession they were· to receive an equivalent strip
along the southern side as far as the northern boundary
of the Fort Wingate military reservation. Arny was apparently more interested in opening the San Juan country
to American settlement and mineral development than in
promoting the program of the government of converting
his charges into an agricultural people. He was willing to
trade them a like amount of "grazing" land on the south
for the northern part which was "worth more than all the
rest of their reservation put together," guaranteeing at the
same time that each family should have a homestead "(and
as far as practicable, water for irrigation) as provided"
in the Treaty of 1868. 29 However, the trade was not ratified by congress; one stumbling block was the right-of-way
28. The reser\•ation, as surveyed by Ed. S. Darling, contained 3,328,302 acres.
John S. Wilson to Cox, 11/26/69, 1847/69.
29. Irvine to Commissioner, 10/1/76, in C. I. A., Annual Report, 18~6. p. 110.
Navajo Agreement, 3/7/74, 0. I. A., New Mexico File, 1874. Arny to Smith, January, 1874, A92/74 and 090/73.
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of the Atlantic and Pacific Railroad Company. Arny was
then advised to examine the country along the eastern side
of the reservation for a possible exchange. 30
Three more proposals were advanced before any modification of the boundary was actually made. Arny suggested
extending it eastward to the 31st parallel (Washington) and
westward to the 35th. Nothing came of this plan and the
Navaho continued their plea for more land. Irvine recommended in 1878 that the western boundary be extended to
include the lower reaches of the Canyon de Chelly, and that
the agency be removed to the San Juan country in order to
induce the Navaho to locate there. When General Sherman
visited the reservation that ~arne year, he recommended an
extension to include all of the Canyon de Chelly. That was
his intention in 1868, but he had not understood what the
term "canyon" meant to the Indians. However, he was not
in favor of granting them any unnecessary increase; although the additional area that the Navaho still wanted was
considered practically worthless, he thought it better. to have
an Indian reservation too small than too large. 31
The government acted immediately on the Sherman
J)l'Oposal and the western boundary was extended to the
llOth meridian between 36° and 37° north latitude. This
concession, however, only strengthened the desire of the Indians for more, and upon the recommendation of Agent
Eastman and Inspector Hammond in 1879, the reservation
was enlarged toward the east. The boundary was extended
fifteen miles up the San Juan river, southward to a point
six miles below the southeast corner of the reservatian,
thence westward to the llOth meridian. Some local opopsition voiced through the territorial legislature ·was not
heeded. 32
30. Clum to Arny, 4/16/75, LB 124, p. 174.
31. Army to Smith, 7/24/75, A496/73. Irving to Smith, 4J13J76, I416/76, and
6/20/76, I673J76. Irvine, Report, 9/1/77, 45 Cong. 2 sess. Hse. Ex. Doc. 1, VIII,
554-55. Sherman .to Secretary of War, 9/8'/78, P843j78, and 9/9/78, W2023/78.
32. Kappler, I, 875. Hayt to Secretary of Interior, 12/17/79, RB 35, p. 610.
Brooks to Secretary of Interior, 3/12/80, RB 36, p. 299.
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The two remaining problems for the government to
solve were education and the liquor evil. Very little was
accomplished in regard to the first one, because it was very
difficult to secure competent teachers or to establish schools
for the widely scattered children. As for whiskey, the
efforts of a particularly zealous agent to restrict this evil
was apt to cause him much embarrassment. The decade
opening with the return to the tribal range closed with
Agent Eastman's relief from duty because of such an embroilment. "To sum up 1 can only say that the Navajo
problem is like the whole Indian question; take whiskey out
of it and governing them and civilizing them is an easy
task. 33
33. Inspector John McNeil to Schurz, Report, 12/23/80, M2510/80. B. I. C.,
Annual Report, 1873, p. 176. L. B. Prince to President Hayes. 5/7/80, P678j80.
Senator T. W. Ferry to Trowbridge, 6/28/80, F103/80.
Galen Eastman succeeded Pyle under appointment of 4/5/79.
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CHAPTER

V

INDIANS AND POLITICS

The Indians in the northern part of the Territory that
were of chief concern to the superintendent of Indian affairs
in New Mexico were the Jicarilla Apache and several bands
of Ute: the Wiminuche, Capote, Tabeguache, and Moache.
The size of the bands was not known accurately, the estimates varying from 700 for the Jicarillas to 1,500 for the
Capote. They did not constitute a serious menace like the
Navaho, but their petty depredations and thieving were a
chronic annoyance to the white settlers. When passing
through the settled areas on the way to the agency, especially in the Chama valley, their horses sometimes invaded
the corn fields and caused considerable damage. At other
times an occasional sheep or cow was appropriated when the
pangs of hunger were particularly pressing. And even a
horse or two might be taken if the chance of a successful
theft appeared particularly good. These practices were
kept alive by the retaliations of the settlers. In fact, it was
hard at times to determine which side was the more at fault. 1
Contact with the settlements was rapidly demoralizing
these bands. At the best they were an unprepossessing people, but the vices of the white man,· particularly the use of
liquor, was reducing them to an even worse state of primitive barbarism. The Jicarillas and Moache were more inclined to hang around the agency than the other bands that
roamed farther afield for subsistence and love of the chase;
consequently they were the worst sufferers. They procured
whiskey from boot-leggers or from the Pueblo Indians who,
legally privileged to buy it, acted as their go-between. A
drunken Indian was a daily sight in the plaza of Taos. 2
1. Carson, Annual Report, 9/20/59, 36 Cong. 1 sess. Sen. Ex. Doc. 2, I, 710f
(1023).
2. Carson. Annual Report, 8/29/60, 36 Cong. 2 sess. Sen. Ex. Doc. 1, I, 88711'
(1078').
"I can assure my readers that no manager of Drury Lane ever produced three
more hideous or unearthly witches than were these half-naked, withered old creatures, their faces striped with red and white paint, their matted grey hair hanging
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As the decade of the eighteen fifties came to a close it
was generally recognized that a reservation removed from
the settlements was necessary for the salvation of these
Indians, or their extermination would result. In addition
to the vices acquired, they were further handicapped by the
fact that the white man was gradually destroying the wild
life on which they were so dependent. As a result, the government was forced to support them more and more, but the ·
value of this aid was diminished by their increasing addiction to liquor. It was "asserted [by Collins] that two thirds
of the articles given to them passed into the hands of the
whiskey dealers, who infest the country, within three days
after they were issued."3 The necessity of concentration in
a restricted area was intensified by the discovery of gold in
the Pike's Peak region. Miners proceeded to penetrate
farther and farther into the country of the Ute in search
of the precious metals.
But their advent ... inaugurated the era of
civilization in a heretofore unbroken wilderness,
and although the rights of the aborigines may seem
to be encroached upon thereby, the apparent injustice of the act is but one of the inevitable contingencies of human progress, and must in the
end prove beneficial to alJ.4
The advent of "civilization" increased the difficulties
of managing the Indians, 5 and until such time as a reservation could ·be established certain measures were taken to
improve their lot. The superintendent had already adopted
the policy of requiring the agents to reside at the scene of
· 3. C. I. A., Annual Report, 11/30/60, 36 Cong. 2 sess. Sen. Ex. Doc. 1,
383 (1078).
Selling liquor to the Indians, except the Pueblos, was punishable by a
$6 to $200. Aet of January 10, 1853, in New Mexico, Revised Statutes, 1865,
4. Henry Villard, The Past and Present of the Pike's Peak Gold Regions,
5. C. I. A., Annual Report, 11/26/59, RB 11, p. 276.

I, 243,
fine of
p. 472.
p. 141.

from their buge heads over their sunken shoulders,· their pendent shriveled breasts,
and their scraggy arms ; while their eyes brightened and their huge mouths grinned
with excitement as they plunged. their cia ws amongst the entrails of the sheep, and
scrambled for the tit-bits." W. A. Bell, New Tracks in North Ameriea, p. 109 (second edition).
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their labor, where they would be accessible to the reds and
whites for the adjustment of any disputes that might arise.
And to solve the pressing problem of drunken Indians at
Taos, that agency was. removed to the Cimarron valley.
These steps created disputes that led to the downfall of
Collins, and, consequently, seriously impaired the possibility of success with the Carleton experiment on the Pecos.
In the first place, the rule about residence raised a conflict
with Diego Archuleta who was in charge .of the Abiquiu
agency.
Under instructions issued in 1857 Archuleta was required to live at the agency located in Abiquiu, or at a point
above that settlement. Furthermore, he was advised to
purchase food for his charges rather than articles of clothing that they might request and to issue supplies only at the
agency. The superintendent believed that the supply of
clothing issued during the summer was sufficient for their
needs for the year; the other instructions were a part of
his general policy. The agent disregarded all of these points,
particularly the rule about residence because it was not convenient for him to live away from his farm, which lay
between Abiquiu and Santa Fe. 6
In order to improve the situation at Abiquiu, A. H.
Pfeiffer was appointed special-agent in 1858 and assumed
the real responsibility for the work of the agency. Archuleta, still in nominal control, was warned that any violation
of instructions about issuing goods only at the agency would
be reported to Washington. The firm stand of the superintendent was supported by the commissioner. Collins hesitated to discharge the agent because of the possibility of
arousing prejudice among the Mexicans. Archuleta was
the only Mexican in the federal service in New Mexico at
that time. 7 The relations between the two grew less satisfactory. He was finally transferred to the Pueblo agency
and then detailed to Fort Stanton in March, 1860, in charge
6.
7.

Collins to Archuleta, 11/7/57, and Collins to Mix, 5/31/58, C630j50.
Collins to Archuleta, 7j2lj58, C630j60, Collins to Denver, 2/13/59, Cl930/59.

THE FEDERAL INDIAN POLICY

53

of the Mescalero Indians, because Agent Steck was fully
occupied west of the Rio Grande with the Gila Apache.
Archuleta left Stanton after a short stay because of
family matters at home. This move brought matters to a
head and he was suspended on July 9, 1860, on the ground of
inefficiency and insubordination. The commissioner requested that he be restored to the Abiquiu agency and that
Pfeiffer be discharged as the best means for restoring
harmony in the service. This the superintendent declined
to do; since his commission under Buchanan was soon to
expire, he determined to leave the issue to his successor. 8
However, he was reappointed in the spring of 1861, so
Archuleta was left to nurse a grudge which found some
comfort in the later ousting of the superintendent. The
removal of Collins was given its initial start by the transfer
of the Ute agency from Taos to the Cimarron.
W. F. M. Arny was appointed Indian agent in May,
1861, and relieved Carson in charge of the Ute agency about
August 1. He immediately took the initiative in trying to
improve the lot of his charges, the Moache Ute and Jicarilla
Apache. He advocated the.current proposal of establishing
them on a reservation removed from contact with the whites,
but until that could be done the agency was located on the
L. B. Maxwell ranch on the Cimarron river to get away
from the evil influences in the vicinity of Taos. About 100
families lived in the Cimarron valley, a much fewer number
than resided in the Taos valley. Both Collins and Carson
(who was an influential citizen in the Taos valley) favored
the move. 9 A violent opposition soon appeared in San
Miguel and Mora counties under the leadership of S. B.
Watrous, a rancher located at the junction of the Mora and
Sapello rivers.
8. Greenwood to Collins, 2/2/61, LB 65, p. 139. See also C630J60.
9. Arny to Dole, 8/2/62, A604J62. Arny to Dole, 1/6/62, A441/61. Arny
Annual Report, 9/1/62, 37 Cong. 3 sess. Hse. Ex. Doc. 1, I, 386-90 ( 1156).
Carson later denied advising the removal: "P. S. It is possible that I may have
advised to locate temporarily the agency at Maxwell's Ranch, but never have I
recommended, to locate it at that place; permanently." Carson to Dole, 10J17/62,
B112j63.
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Upon taking charge at Taos, Arny had been immediately
confronted with complaints from Watrous about the Indians
stealing his cattle. The agent acknowledged that the complaint was quite common, but argued that the defendants
were not entirely at fault. He pointed out that the owner
entrusted the care of his herds to men at points remote from
the ranch headquarters where they could kill cattle for their
own use, sell some to others, and lay the blame on the
Indians. The solution to the problem was to locate the
Indians on a reservation. While they· were roaming over
several thousand miles of territory, it was impossible to keep
close check on them and distinguish between Indian depredations and those committed by unscrupulous white men.
The rancher next raised the issue with the superintendent.
Collins pointed out that the proprietary rights of the Indians
in the soil had never been extinguished by the government,
that the Indians were natural thieves, and that the whites
lived near them at their own risk. But he went a step
further, adding fuel to the flames of controversy, by accusing the rancher of having been the boon companion of one
Taylor who had recently fled the country because of a grand
jury indictment for stealing cattle, and that the said Taylor
was not the only thief in the locality of Mr. Watrous. 10 The
rancher indignantly denied the charge and intemperate
language was used by both parties, Mr. Collins referring to
Mr. Watrous at one time as "a low dirty slanderer."11
The complaint against Collins for not protecting the
cattle of the settlers from Indian depredations, a herculean
task utterly beyond his means at the time, widened out into
an aggressive movement for his removal. The attack was
centered on the two political fronts in Washington and
Santa Fe. Representatives E. P. Walton and H. P. Bennet
endorsed the objections of Watrous to the new location of
the Ute agency; it was in the heart of the grazing country
10. Arny to S. B. Watrous, 10/ll/61, C1409/61.
C1409/61.
11. Collins to Watrous, 12/19/61, L69j63.

Collins to Watrous, 10/26/61,
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and too near the mail route from the East. The communications with the East were often endangered by the plains
Indians, and this new menace should not be added. A direct
protest from Bennet to Arny was met with the question,
"Will yoi.l give us your aid to restrict these Indians to a
specified Territory?" 12 About 350 residents of San Miguel
and Mora counties signed a petition to Commissioner Dole,
September 10, 1862, that the agency be not located at Cimarron. They charged that it was not centrally located, as
at Taos, but was on the eastern limit of the Apache range,
where more stock grazed with fewer inhabitants to protect
it, that it drew the Ute away from their own country, and
that the move was made for the benefit of a few engaged in
trade and interested in the disbursement of government
funds. With the scarcity of game they claimed the Indians
resorted to the cattle herds and that "up to the present time,
the white man has had no rights, which the Indian has been
made to respect.... " We hope "That we may no lqnger
be hewers of wood, and drawers of water, for indolent,
thieving, murderous Savages." We demand protection!
"Shall it be refused us?" Sixteen members of the territorial
legislature signed a similar petition. 13
A petition for the removal of the superintendent, presented to the legislative assembly in 1861, was laid over
until the next session on the ground of insufficient time to
investigate the subject fully. But this friendly attitude did
not appear in the next assembly, partly because of another
issue that had been injected.
Under a territorial law of 1857, the public printer had
been customarily elected iri a joint meeting of the two
houses. In 1861 the territorial secretary had attempted to
control this piece of patronage; and as the secretary of the
treasury at Washington had sustained the secretary of the
territory, the decision precipitated an open conflict in 1862.14
12. Arny to Bennet, August, 1862, New Mexico File, 1862. Walton to Dole,
4/14/62, W566j62.
13. See Bll2/63.
14. Arny to Legislature, 12/5/62, Legislative Assembly, House Journal,· 1863, p.
77, 107-109.
.
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Arny had been appointed secretary of the territory, July 31,
. 1862. On September 22 he became acting-governor because
of the absence of Governor Connelly, who went east for
surgical treatment. 15 Despite the election of Samuel Ellison
as public printer in December, 1862, Arny awarded the
printing to Collins on the ground that the territorial law
was in conflict with federal law and with the decision of the
secretary of the treasury to whom the secretary of the territory was responsible. He had stated that he would make
the award to some person who would execute it with economy
"and in regard to whose loyalty there will be no doubt." 16
The question of loyalty raised by Arny was based on
the failure of Collins to support the Lincoln administration
through the columns of his paper, the Santa Fe Weekly
Gazette, although he was loyal to the Union, having accompanied the federal army during the Texas invasion.U But
the question of loyalty could be raised on both sides. In
. his controversy with Watrous, Collins had forwarded the
correspondence to Washington. He next accused the rancher
of being politically allied with a leader of the rebellion
against the Americans after the occupation of New Mexico
by Colonel Kearny. That man was Diego Archuleta, who
now occupied the strategic position of chairman of the committee on Indian affairs in the territorial house of representatives. He further chided Watrous for not seeking an
understanding and possible reconciliation with him long
before instead of attacking him through the agency of his
political opponent. 18 These moves roused the ire of the
rancher to fever pitch.
Watrous now took steps to vindicate his character by
securing testimonials from prominent leaders in territorial
politics. The old charge of association with Taylor rankled
in his mind; the accusation was of doubtful validity, but the
personal controversy had long passed into the wider ques15.
16.
17.
18.

New Mexico, Executive Records, 1851-1867, p. 299, 304.
House Journal, 1863, p. 102, 96.
Charles Lieb to J. P. Usher, 2/22/63, L69/63. See also C580j60.
Watrous to Collins, 1/13j63, and Collins to Watrous, 1/16/63, W52/63.
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tion of the removal of the superintendent. The rancher
defended Archuleta on the ground that he had been pardoned for his attempted treason. The suggested possibility
that a reconciliation might have been patched up was dismissed with contempt: "Fortunately, I have not repented
the Treason, of defending my own rights, and that of the
people, which you have so long trampled under foot, and
from the insight I have obtained of your real character, I
do not aspire to the honor of your friendship .... " 19
The house of representatives initiated on January 10,
1863, a joint resolution for the investigation of the official
conduct of Collins. The council concurred, but Governor
Arny blocked the investigation on the ground that a memorial to congress was the proper procedure. The memorial,
addressed to the President of the United States, was passed
and the following charges made: (1) the people have become impoverished because of his mismanagement and
inaction; (2) he has been unfaithful to the government by
erecting a building with Indian bureau funds and charging
a large rent for its use as headquarters for the superintendency, by depositing a note in lieu of money with the receiver
of the land office, by securing vouchers and blank receipts
for Indian money without having made purchase, and by
permitting his grandson to sell some government cloth. 20
Although Collins would have welcomed an investigation on his home ground, he was now forced to carry the
battle to Washington. There his opponent pressed the
attack vigorously. Watrous wrote to the secretary of the
interior:
A man who will slander another, in the sneaking way he has done me, will do anything. I believe
such a man will steal, without hesitation, and it
was this belief, ·that induced me to urge on the
Legislature an investigation of his conduct, as the
only means by which his rascality could be brought
to light, and the country be relieved from the in19.
20.

Watrous to Collins, 1/20/63, W52/63.
House Journal. 1863, p. 127, 132, 137, 147, 157.

Also 858'/63 and W42j63.
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jury he is inflicting upon it. They (the people) are
now thoroughly aroused to a sense of their condition, and are determined that their rights shall no
longer be trampled under foot by unprincipled
demagogues, like S'upt. Collins, Watts [Territorial
Delegate], and Arny.
The interests of the Territory require, that
this nest of unprincipled Harpies, should be cleared
out, and good honest officers from the states, be
appointed in their stead, who are entirely unconnected with the old rotten stock of Politicians out
here.
The people feel confident, that the Watts policy
of sustaining secess. sympathizers in office, to save
the Union, is played completely out, and Watts, ·
its Advocate, is played out with it. He is politically dead, dead, dead, in this Territory. 21

With the weight of the legislature behind the charges,
the commissioner of Indian affairs accorded them more consideration thatn he would have done if preferred only by
private parties. He recommended to the secretary of the
interior that an investigation be made if the distance was
not too great to cause an unwarrantable delay, in which case
more prompt action should be taken. Apparently the distance was too great because ·collins was removed from
office in May, with the possibility of being reinstated if the
charges were later disproved.. But New Mexico was a distant region, and an investigation would be an unwanted
expense. The financial accounts of the superintendency
were thrown into confusion by the order to suspend payment
on all outstanding drafts, and a claim of Collins for house
rent was disallowed. The outstanding obligations of the
superintendency were eventually found valid and paid, but
as to reinstatement in office, the commissioner remarked:
"I can only say further that if Col. Collins had not been
removed, I should not, with the evidence now before me,
21.

1/30/63, W52j63.
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recommend his removaJ.2 2 Thus an able superintendent
was removed from office on insufficient grounds. The
grievavce of the people at the inadequate governmental control of tne Indians had found an outlet in the interplay of
party politics.
While the quarrels of the superintendent were working
toward an end, the· condition of the Indians was one of increasing difficulty and dependence upon the government.
The Navaho war and hostilities with the plains tribes barred
the Ute from their customary hunting grounds; As a result,
they remained closer to the agencies and indulged in more
petty thieving. This irritating practice was carried on more
from necessity than desire; although they had a natural
tendency to pilfer, they were friendly in a formal way with
the whites. And as they were barred from the buffalo herds,
and the mountain wild life decreased, the limited funds of
the superintendent became more and more inadequate to
meet the need for food. To impress the Washington authorities with the state of affairs, the situation was summed up
in the statement, "They will steal rather than starve." 23
When this statement is compared with the one that typified
the Navaho problem, namely, "you can feed them cheaper
than you can fight them," the main difference between the
two problems is presented: numerous campaigns against
the New Mexico Ute never occurred.
But though the Ute remaining close to the settlements
in northern New Mexico were .addicted to nothing worse
than stealing, their brethren farther north were not too
friendly to the intruding miners. When the southern Ute
wandered northward in the spring of 1859, Carson was
ordered to follow after to prevent trouble. Despite such
22. Dole to Usher, 4/25/63, RB 13, p. 163. Usher to Dole, 4/28/63, 1157/63.
Dole to Usher, 7/25/63, RB 13, p. 207.
Collins, later in charge of the U. S. Depository at Santa Fe, was murdered June 5,
1869, when an attempt was made to steal the government funds. E<~:ecutive Records,
1867-82, p. 34.
23. Manzanares to Steck, 9/23/63, 38 Cong. 1 seas. Hse. Ex. Doc. 1, lll, 231,
(1182). Arny to Carleton, 10/25/62, A674/62.
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precaution a small party of miners was killed that year. 24
The same possibility of trouble rapidly extended over a
wide area as the mining frontier advanced into the San
Juan country. The Capote and Wiminuche might tolerate
prospecting and actual mining operation, but they disliked
the permanent settlement that seemed to be a corollary to
the search for gold. The Indians carried their complaints
to the agent .at Abiquiu and the superintendent relayed them
to Washington. The ultimate outcome of the rapidly developing problem was not hard to forecast. Indian country was
no more sacrosanct in the Rocky Mountain area than it had
been elsewhere. In two letters written in 1861, Collins presented the facts and drew the conclusion: in January he
wrote,
If the discovery of gold on the San Juan
proves a success some arrangement should be made
with those Indians for their country which will
certainly be taken away from them. The country is
a valuable one, and they should be paid for it.
But this will be a. question for the new administration,
and four months later, he said that they should be paid for
their country if it is to be taken "of which there is now no
longer a doubt." 25
Several steps were early adopted by the government for
the better management of the southern Ute. With the creation of Colorado Territory, a new agency was established
on the Conejos and the Tabeguache were transferred there
from the Taos agency in 1861. Three years later, on the
recommendation of Steck and Governor John Evans of Colorado, the Moache were ordered to join their brethren. In
the San Juan country, eighty signatures were secured to a
petition for the transfer of the Abiquiu agency to Baker
City on the Rio de las Animas, a request that was not
granted; however, Pfeiffer was sent there temporarily as a
24. Collins to Mix, 5/7/59, C2073/59. Collins to Greenwood, 10/16/59, C197/59.
25. Collins to Greenwood, 1/27/61, C934/61. Collins to Commissioner, 4/7/61,
C1034/61.
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special agent in the spring of 1861, his place at Abiquiu
being taken by Manzanares. 26
The next measure taken was the establishment of a
reservation in the San Luis valley in southern Colorado by
agreement, October 7, 1863, with the Tabeguache. The
boundaries of the restricted area were as follows : beginning
at the mouth of the Uncompahgre river, thence down the
Gunnison to the Bunkara river, up that stream to Roaring
Fork, thence to the source, from there along the summit of
the Arkansas-Gunnison divide to the intersection with the
San Luis Valley-Gunnison fork of the Great Colorado, along
the divide to the source of the Uncompaghre, down that
river to its mouth.
The reservation was open to mining, military posts,
highways, and railroads. Goods and provisions were granted
for ten years at an annual cost of $20,000. If stolen property was not returned, the victims could be compensated
· from the annuity goods. The government agreed to furnish
five American stallions to improve the Indian stock, 150
head of cattle annually for five years, 1,000 sheep annually
for two years, and 500 annually for the next three years, and
one blacksmith. The Moache were permitted to settle on the
same reservation (if and when they would). And the treaty
was operative when the chiefs announced to the agents their
willingness to settle down to farming and stock raising. 27
The Indians South West of them [southwest
of the Tabeguarhe] were present by their agents
and representatives at the treaty and conceded the
full right of said Tabeguache band to the country
described & claimed by them as set forth in the
treaty. 28
With the initial step taken in the application of the
reservation policy to the southern Ute, the final realization
of that aim was only a:ttained after considerable delay,
26.
tion see
27.
28.

Usher to Dole, 2/1/64, 1421/64. Steek to Dole 12/11/63, 8215/63. For petiC1215j61, and Dole to Collins, 5/14/61, LB 65, p, 452.
Kappler, II, 856-58.
Evans to Dole, January, 1864, Colo. 622/64.

62

NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW

friction, and irritation between the Indians, settlers, and
representatives of the government. The first difficulty was
to convince the Moache that they must transfer their allegiance from the Cimarron agency to the Conejos, and the
next problem was to persuade the Capote and Wiminuche to
accept an agency on a Ute reservation in southwestern Colorado. Many proposals were advanced for a location of the
Jicarillas, but they were just as intractable as the Ute.

